itary radar screen – intruders to the country’s exclusive economic zone in the hotly disputed West Philippine Sea in Palawan.
In a security scenario like this, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) can still effectively repel the incursion by employing an alternative land-based fighting strategy while still in the process of developing credible air and maritime defense capabilities, a United States-based think tank suggested.
“An alternative strategy would be for it (AFP) to take advantage of its geographic location to the Spratly Islands and meet China’s challenge from an asymmetric angle. Rather than directly confront Chinese strengths in air and naval warfare, the Philippines could pose a challenge with a strategy built around new technologies for coastal defenses that would have lower long-term procurement and maintenance costs,” Felix Chang of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) said.
Earlier, another US-based think tank warned the Chinese navy’s buildup of large amphibious ships and aircraft carriers could enable China to undertake punitive raids against Palawan by the early 2020s.
During an arms exhibit in Bangkok in early March, the China Shipbuilding Co. revealed a new concept for a 20,000-ton Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious assault ship that would carry over 1,000 troops, a design that likely will soon enter the Chinese navy.
“China’s intention to base its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and future aircraft carriers on Hainan Island signals Chinese military desires to be able to impose control over the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea) region,” the Center for a New American Security in its third bulletin said.
But this particular case, FPRI said the Philippines, while building a strong Air Force and Navy, must also develop a credible land-based defense, particularly in the coastal areas of Palawan and Zambales.
“Palawan Island is situated only 450 kilometers from even the most distant Philippine claims in the Spratly group. Mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missiles could cover most of these contested islands,” the FPRI said.
These mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missiles could be acquired by the Philippines to bolster its air and maritime defenses. These include the US’s RGM-84L Harpoon, RGM-109B Tomahawk, India’s BrahMos, and Russia’s P-800 Yakhont.
FPRI said Vietnam has recently ordered two batteries of P-800 missiles to protect its South China Sea claims.
“Four batteries of such anti-ship missiles mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles and dispersed along Palawan’s long road network could satisfy the Philippines’ capability requirement to deliver the massed firepower necessary to penetrate shipboard defenses,” the FPRI said.
“Unlike its still limited air and naval capabilities, the AFP acquiring and employing these land-based mobile anti-ship missiles would be to defend its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from intruders and reduce the possibility that China could suppress them with either air or ballistic missile strikes.”
FPRI noted that Chinese reconnaissance satellites might find it easy to detect and locate fixed installations and help target land-attack missiles against them.
Mobile targets, however, are far tougher to locate, as coalition forces during the First Gulf War discovered during their hunt for Iraqi Scud-B mobile ballistic missiles in 1991.
With ample jungle cover and good emissions discipline, FPRI said the Philippine coastal defense batteries could remain hidden and highly effective against the Chinese forces.
“To counter these batteries, China would have to send aircraft, helicopters, or unmanned aerial systems deep into Philippine airspace over Palawan to pinpoint them, placing them at risk from land-based Philippine air defenses,” FPRI said.
Ramping up external defense to protect its territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea has forced the country to confront the central issue of how it can exert enough air-sea control in the hotly contested region so its opponents are denied unimpeded access.
China has already fortified all its occupied reefs and islets in the region with their vessels frequently spotted in the region either on patrol or bringing supplies to their troops on forward deployment in the Spratlys.
“Since the outcome of air and naval warfare is largely determined by the platforms that carry them out, the core procurement decision for Manila is: What set of capabilities it can afford that could best put at risk its adversary’s platforms – the most formidable of which are those of China’s modernized air and naval forces. In the missile age that means the capabilities the Philippines eventually chooses to acquire must be able to deliver sufficient firepower to overcome its adversary’s ability to defend its platforms,” Chang said.
In a security scenario like this, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) can still effectively repel the incursion by employing an alternative land-based fighting strategy while still in the process of developing credible air and maritime defense capabilities, a United States-based think tank suggested.
“An alternative strategy would be for it (AFP) to take advantage of its geographic location to the Spratly Islands and meet China’s challenge from an asymmetric angle. Rather than directly confront Chinese strengths in air and naval warfare, the Philippines could pose a challenge with a strategy built around new technologies for coastal defenses that would have lower long-term procurement and maintenance costs,” Felix Chang of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) said.
Earlier, another US-based think tank warned the Chinese navy’s buildup of large amphibious ships and aircraft carriers could enable China to undertake punitive raids against Palawan by the early 2020s.
During an arms exhibit in Bangkok in early March, the China Shipbuilding Co. revealed a new concept for a 20,000-ton Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious assault ship that would carry over 1,000 troops, a design that likely will soon enter the Chinese navy.
“China’s intention to base its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and future aircraft carriers on Hainan Island signals Chinese military desires to be able to impose control over the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea) region,” the Center for a New American Security in its third bulletin said.
But this particular case, FPRI said the Philippines, while building a strong Air Force and Navy, must also develop a credible land-based defense, particularly in the coastal areas of Palawan and Zambales.
“Palawan Island is situated only 450 kilometers from even the most distant Philippine claims in the Spratly group. Mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missiles could cover most of these contested islands,” the FPRI said.
These mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missiles could be acquired by the Philippines to bolster its air and maritime defenses. These include the US’s RGM-84L Harpoon, RGM-109B Tomahawk, India’s BrahMos, and Russia’s P-800 Yakhont.
FPRI said Vietnam has recently ordered two batteries of P-800 missiles to protect its South China Sea claims.
“Four batteries of such anti-ship missiles mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles and dispersed along Palawan’s long road network could satisfy the Philippines’ capability requirement to deliver the massed firepower necessary to penetrate shipboard defenses,” the FPRI said.
“Unlike its still limited air and naval capabilities, the AFP acquiring and employing these land-based mobile anti-ship missiles would be to defend its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from intruders and reduce the possibility that China could suppress them with either air or ballistic missile strikes.”
FPRI noted that Chinese reconnaissance satellites might find it easy to detect and locate fixed installations and help target land-attack missiles against them.
Mobile targets, however, are far tougher to locate, as coalition forces during the First Gulf War discovered during their hunt for Iraqi Scud-B mobile ballistic missiles in 1991.
With ample jungle cover and good emissions discipline, FPRI said the Philippine coastal defense batteries could remain hidden and highly effective against the Chinese forces.
“To counter these batteries, China would have to send aircraft, helicopters, or unmanned aerial systems deep into Philippine airspace over Palawan to pinpoint them, placing them at risk from land-based Philippine air defenses,” FPRI said.
Ramping up external defense to protect its territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea has forced the country to confront the central issue of how it can exert enough air-sea control in the hotly contested region so its opponents are denied unimpeded access.
China has already fortified all its occupied reefs and islets in the region with their vessels frequently spotted in the region either on patrol or bringing supplies to their troops on forward deployment in the Spratlys.
“Since the outcome of air and naval warfare is largely determined by the platforms that carry them out, the core procurement decision for Manila is: What set of capabilities it can afford that could best put at risk its adversary’s platforms – the most formidable of which are those of China’s modernized air and naval forces. In the missile age that means the capabilities the Philippines eventually chooses to acquire must be able to deliver sufficient firepower to overcome its adversary’s ability to defend its platforms,” Chang said.
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